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Elizabeth Grosz, Jean Fox O’Barr Professor in Gender, Sexuality and 
Feminist Studies at Duke University, has played a pivotal role in changing 
expectations about what feminist philosophy can do and how it 
should be done. Alongside, and often in a productive friction with, 
some other notable feminist philosophers (see Colebrook, 2017, Hird, 
2017 and Povinelli, Coleman & Yusoff, 2017), Grosz has insisted on 
nothing short of cosmological limits for feminism, rather than seeing 
feminist modes of inquiry as constrained by current formations. To 
this end, her work has consistently engaged with the ‘outside’ of politics, 
located in the forces and the temporalities of the cosmos. In conversation 
with Foucault and Deleuze (who were in turn engaged with Maurice 
Blanchot), Grosz’s work is attentive to the ways in which the forces of the 
universe organize the very possibilities of immanence in given structures, 
and to the way these experiences of the outside (Foucault, 1990: 15) press 
on and deform – as well as incite – social, sexual and political relations 
(Grosz, 2008). What she takes from the cosmic ‘outside’ is how these 
inhuman forces modify social relations, where the social is always lived in 
relation to and in defiance of that celestial storm. 
 
Grosz has consistently argued that we need to recognize that universes 
(to come) are ‘possibles’ of a present anterior that need to be welcomed in 
all their difference. The welcoming of the new is not just a moment of 
hospitality to enlarge the possibilities of the universe and make it otherwise 
(although this is undoubtedly its creative and sexual charge), it is 
also a crucial movement toward more just and fulfilling feminist futures 
that are not curtailed by the power dynamics of their pasts. In this political 
alignment between feminist futures and the earth, Grosz (2008, 
2011) pushes beyond the disciplinary limitations of the earth and biological 
sciences while identifying the potential of those resources to be 
used differently. 
 
The productive engine of difference is at the heart of this realignment 
of the sciences and the claim for a cosmological perspectivism for feminism. 
As Grosz argues, difference is the generative force of the world 
that enacts materiality: ‘The movement of difference that marks the very 
energies of existence before and beyond any lived or imputed identity. It 
is the inhuman work of difference . . . difference stretches, transforms, and 
opens up any identity to its provisional vicissitudes’ (Grosz, 2011: 91). 
The challenge of differentiating from patriarchal pasts (that has been an 
aspect of Grosz’s earlier psychoanalytical work on Lacan, Laplanche and 
Irigaray) reappears in a more recent engagement with the earth and its 
forces, and in the challenge of making feminist futures uncontained by 
the pasts that have sought to contain and marshal those forces to particular 
oppressive ends. With discussions of materialism (2005), the framing 
of the earth (2008), and geopower (2011), Grosz has pushed towards 
a future that dares to claim for feminist theory – as one of her chapters is 
entitled – ‘Dreams for New Knowledge’ (2001: 74). The kind of feminism 
that this delivers is one that is open to the future by way of openness to 
the forces of the world that are always already excessive. This attachment 
to an expansive field of engagement for feminism as both a mode of 
philosophical inquiry and an organization of material explication is 
deeply hopeful in its rendering of possibles that ‘act up’ and challenge 
the presumed given-ness of place. 
 
In keeping with the space and tenor of the unfolding of what Deleuze 
and Grosz each call chaos, Grosz’s approach both explicitly addresses 
patriarchal forms and allows an excess to enter the frame that exceeds 
that address and takes us elsewhere into the possibility of new formations. 
In parallel to anti-racist and decolonizing literatures, resistance is 
pushed through the recognition and partaking of new material relations 
with and in the earth (see Last, 2017, this issue). 
 
In the transformation of materials from the past into resources for the 
future, Grosz’s work is deeply geophilosophical. It attends to both the 
virtuality of earth forces and the modes of realization of territory as an 
ongoing engagement with terrestrial forces; territory is a ‘provisional 
stability’ (2008: 70), and one that mobilizes sensations and affects. 
Grosz argues that the recognition of the two orders of the inhuman – 
the pre-individual and the impersonal – provides a freedom for the subject 
‘who understands that culture and history have an outside, are 
framed and given position, only through the orders of difference that 
structure the material world’ (2011: 97). In this sense, Grosz resists the 
easy political gratification of over-determined accounts of earth forces, 
without losing any of the contours of how power, sex, race, oppression, 
biology and futurity function through those forces to underpin geopolitical 
and subject formations (2011). In the recognition of difference as 
the undoing of stability and consistency in subjects, Grosz sets out to 
understand the regimes of teaming acts that constitute the formations 
called patriarchy, racism, heteronormativity as a multiplicity of acts and 
bodily positions with a shared patterning but not a latent order. She 
suggests that we consider these acts as what we are and what we make 
‘that constitute the conditions under which other kinds of inventions, 
other kinds of acts, become possible’ (2011: 98). 
 
If one of Grosz’s recent geophilosophical contributions is thinking 
through power and its movement through the earth into art and politics 
(through her critical reading of Darwin, Bergson and Deleuze), the other 
is her sustained attention to the role of the inhuman in the humanities. In 
relation to the outside, inhumanism is crucial in the way it both provokes 
new geosocial formations into being and modifies the claims to autonomy 
within any such relation. This relation to the extant energy of inhuman 
forces puts pressure on, but also creates possibility in, material and 
political life; life that is historically contingent but cosmically determined 
in ways that produce a divergence towards an excess or overcoming of 
those same material and political conditions. These inhuman forces situate 
desire by way of framing an incomprehensible universe (as in art that 
brings shreds of chaos into sensation) and as a means of actualizing that 
virtuality for the creation of new forms of becoming and differentiation. 
The capitalization on the forces of the universe – or geopower, as Grosz 
puts it (2011) – has the potential to be harnessed as pleasure and as 
capital accumulation. But while these geopowers might subtend political 
potentials, they are never reducible to them – and so always remain 
radically open to transformation. Geopowers might well be channelled 
in capitalism, but the organization of power belongs to the earth – even 
as the earth is itself is opened to new forms of becoming through the 
reorganization of its forces. As Bergson writes: ‘the universe endures’, 
and in her rejoinder Grosz argues: ‘becoming infects not only beings in/as 
duration, but the world itself’ (2008: 16). What is important in this 
approach is that excess is not dismembered from its potentials, and 
this virtuality of the cosmos remains as a form of commons for all life, 
rather than being reduced to the limits of its utility in social worlds (2008: 
67) or fully repatriated to the side of consciousness. And in this regard, 
the act of framing chaos is a way to make ‘sensation live, each evokes a 
people and an earth to come, each summons up and pays homage to 
imperceptible cosmic forces, each participates in the (political) overcoming 
of the present and helps bring a new rich, and resonating future into 




Nigel Clark and Kathryn Yusoff: There are still very few theorists in the 
humanities and the social sciences who write about fully inhuman or geologic 
or inorganic forces, let alone writing through or with these forces. On 
the face of it, an interest in sexed and gendered human or even nonhuman 
bodies does not seem the obvious place to start in order to arrive at the 
definitively unsexed, non-sensual and undesirous domains of the geologic. 
Could you tell us something about the kind of questions, provocations or 
attractions that drew you into engagement with the ‘geo’? 
 
 
Elizabeth Grosz: Well, in a way, the geological/geographic order is the 
most tangible and concrete condition for all forms of life, and indeed, for 
the existence of all terrestrial objects. It is often left out of consideration 
in addressing philosophical and political questions, elided or considered 
inert, non-living. For me, it was, to begin with, Foucault’s writings on 
questions of space and geography that made explicit not only the historical 
and genealogical emergence of specific forms of power, but also its 
geographical conditions. We have tended to imbue life with history, with 
temporal progress, but we have largely left unthought its geological context. 
The ‘geo’ is an inversion of the ‘ego’! It leads us to understand what 
may have an agency or force on forms of life and on material objects: the 
earth itself, while ‘unliving’ as chemical elements and forces, can be 
understood as having a kind of life of its own when it is understood as 
a system of order and organization that is continually changing, never 
fully stable, dynamic. If dynamism is a quality of the earth as a whole, if 
the very framework of life, its literal grounds, are never fully stable – or 
rather, are functionally metastable – then all our conceptions of life, and 
the human, acquire a kind of unstable, potentially transforming ground. 
To see life as coming from the earth and its forces – gravitational, magnetic, 
electrical and so on – is perhaps the most powerful and direct way 
to destabilize our concepts of identity and agency. If the earth is riven by 
agents, acts and events – if it is not inert and passive – then life cannot be 
understood to master itself; life must look outside itself to attain the 
possibility of continuing itself and knowing itself. 
 
 
NC and KY: Unlike some of the writings on life that stress a certain 
amount of incessant activity, geologists and other evolutionary scientists 
(for example, Stephen Jay Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium) 
have tended to emphasize the role of stasis, of nothing much happening 
for vast stretches of geologic time, which is punctuated by the often 
abrupt and catastrophic events that form the geologic record. So while 
the thin fleshy biosphere might always be in the rapture of dynamism, the 
geological feedstock has tended to be thought of as a metastable ‘foundation’ 
that is only subject to infrequent dynamism. Given your understanding 
of life as provoked by a lack of fit between the organism and the 
world, how would you characterize this temporal ‘lack of fit’ between the 
organic and inorganic? Or, to put it another way, how does geology 
provoke life as a consequence of this temporal/durational difference? 
That is, how can we see life both ‘coming from’ but also going away 
from the earth and its forces? 
 
 
EG: In my understanding, there is no equilibrium in real environments 
but at best only in small fields where the potential for change is already 
exhausted. If there is a relative stabilization at the geological level – 
which in any case is not true of specific locations, which are always 
subjected to change – it is only a question of level: the geological is 
always moving, always transforming, even if it is not always impacted 
by catastrophic events (that is, events catastrophic to particular forms of 
life rather than to any geological formation), is continuously marked by 
the events that occur below and near the surface of the earth. It is a 
question of scale. On the level of vast geologic periods – eras lasting 
billions of years – there may be intermittent or punctuated catastrophes 
(these are very far from equilibrium), but at the level of, say, the ‘lived’ 
time of a geological element – the time it takes, for example, for a stalagmite 
to form – there is continuous, unpunctuated (even if interrupted 
and transformed) change. As metastable, the geologic cannot function as 
foundation or beginning without it being rife with disparities, without it 
being an order of endless, intimate contrary forces which generate the 
necessity for change. The geologic provokes life to the extent that it is 
metastable, to the extent that is in a continual process of resolving differences 
of flow between different inorganic forces – electrico-magnetic, 
chemical and so on – that are also the raw materials and conditions for 
life’s emergence from an environment. The geologic is the condition for 
the distinction between life and a milieu, insofar as life itself is not a given 
identity but relies on the emergence of a prior mode of chemical (and 
geologic) organization. I am not sure that this is merely a temporal process, 
without it also being a spatial process. We can see life as both coming and 
going away from the earth and its forces. It is precisely this disparation 
between these two forces that generates problems whose resolutions 
move from the earth (a disparation that appears as well in the 
simultaneous functioning of past and future on the present). To the extent 
that it emerges, in evolutionary terms, from the earth, life is always from 
the earth and remains affected by the earth and its forces even as it 
generates a kind of higher order ‘minerality’, a different geological 
circulation. But, as you suggest, life is a departure from the earth, or at 
least from what is already contained in it, insofar as life elaborates from 
this metastability what has never happened before, what cannot be 
predicted in advance, and what can be invented. The 
earth is perhaps not the only geologic and cosmological system that can 
contain life; life on earth directs itself to the stars, little by little, as it too 
comes from the stars. 
 
 
NC and KY: You recently used the notion of ‘geopower’ as a way of 
characterizing the geological, inhuman and preindividuated forces that 
subtend and provoke organic life. For many readers, the obvious counterpart, 
or perhaps counterpoint, to geopower will be Foucault’s concept 
of biopower – which is to say to a specific set of technologies or strategies 
for managing bodies. For many social scientists, in particular, 
Foucauldian notions of biopower and the biopolitical have been taken 
to imply that it is no longer possible to speak of biology in any way other 
than as an object of human political ordering. All of which seems very 
different from what your concept of geopower seems to be setting out to 




EG: I don’t think I introduced the concept of geopower at all! I seem to 
recall it from Foucault’s work, especially his ‘Questions on Geography’ 
(Foucault, 1980), which was for me a very important text insofar as it 
introduced the idea that geography is itself the object of power relations. 
I don’t think it is analogous to his concept of biopower, which addresses 
precisely the social regulation of bodies and their actions, their positioning 
in a grid through which power can regulate and normalize the behaviour 
of bodies. For him, biopower regulates a body from the outside: it is 
a body, or many bodies, insofar as they intersect with and are transformed 
by institutions and their requirements. One could use a different 
concept of biopower than the one Foucault developed, if one wishes to 
produce a greater symmetry between biopower and geopower than he 
does: this would require biopower to be considered not only as a body 
insofar as it is regulated by historically specific forms of power, but the 
powers of a body, in principle unknowable to the extent that we do not 
know what a body can do. In other words, biopower could be understood 
as the powers that operate in and through living bodies, the powers 
of a body that can be harnessed for particular forms of action and passion. 
This would draw it closer to his own concept of geopower, the 
powers of the earth that may enable life to survive. Rather than concede 
geopower as the power that humans can extract from or hold over 
the geological, he sees geopower as the forces of the earth. In many 
ways, it is probably Deleuze and Guattari – and their depersonalized 
(and some say depoliticized) conception of power as forces that run 
through things – who have been responsible for a more geological 
focus, in some kind of alliance with Foucault, who are philosophers 
who have enabled us to address not only space but, above all, the 
earth as the coagulation of various forces, organized by the plane of 
planes, as constructions by life that address the living forces of the 
earth. Deleuze and Guattari have insisted on the irreducibility of the 
geological, not only as a stratified diagram of the real, but also as 
the condition for the excess of energy beyond identity that marks 
every living thing with the milieus or environments that make them 
possible and link them together. 
 
In brief, I agree that Foucault’s concept of biopower is very different 
from his (and Deleuze and Guattari’s) concept of geopower. Biopower is, 
for Foucault, the power over life that regulates it from outside; but geopower 
has no outside, no ‘place’ or ‘time’ before or beyond it: it is the 
force, the forces, of the earth itself: forces which we as technical humans 
have tried to organize, render consistent and predictable, but which we 
can never fully accomplish insofar as the earth remains the literal ground 
and condition for every human, and non-human, action. 
 
NC and KY: Historically, the inhuman has been posited as a condition 
that was understood to be against life (Lyotard, 1991) or as a form of 
bare life rendered through a deadly exercise of biopower. How might the 
inhuman be rethought as a stratified condition that both supplements 
and subtends biopolitics? What kind of shift in genealogy does this represent 
for the conceptualization of the body politic of the human? 
 
EG: If the inhuman is not understood as against the human, its opposite 
or overcoming, but rather both the preconditions and the excess within 
the human, if we understand what is creative and inventive in the human 
as something impersonal, with forces we summon up rather than control, 
then it is a line that runs through human actions. In fact, it may be part 
of the explanation for the cultural necessity of biopolitical regulation: 
there is something in humans (and other living beings) that is beyond 
conscious control and social regulation. The increasingly microscopic 
interventions of biopower take as their object smaller and smaller 
forces and processes of the body as something to be mastered while 
leaving inadequately addressed the body’s inhuman even quantum 
forces. Biopower requires as its other precisely the inhuman, which it 
aims to make an object of regulation. Or put in other words, it is the 
inhuman in the human that resists biopolitics and perhaps requires some 
form of it. The inhuman within the human, as resistance, is the creative 
force that enables (some) humans to transform their conditions of existence, 
to make, create, invent. Moreover, this inhuman is the gel of a 
human collectivity that is perhaps best understood through art, which 
musters both the elements from the earth and from the inhuman effects 
of the human. 
 
 
NC and KY: In some of the recent – if still rare – philosophical engagements 
with minerality, the geologic or the inorganic, it seems as though 
what is considered most interesting is the capacity to sooner or later 
come to life, or at least to self-organize into new and interesting forms. 
But if we survey all the matter in the universe – or even in the interior 
bulk of the earth – life is actually rather rare. Indeed, we might even 
describe the emergence of life on earth as a singular event. As geologist 
Jan Zalasiewicz reminds us, ‘minerals can remain in a metastable state 
virtually forever, if nothing catalyses their breakdown’ (2008: 20). In this 
regard, are we still largely engaging with the geologic in terms that we can 
recognize and identify with, rather than ‘in itself’? Philosophically, politically, 
or aesthetically speaking, is there any traction in the physicochemical 
stratum when it endures or obdures in states that are neither 
self-activating nor activated by the living? 
 
 
EG: There are two different questions here, I think. First, a question 
about the ontological or ontogenetic distinction between life and inorganic 
matter; and second, an epistemological question about how the 
geologic can be known in itself. Ontologically, I don’t think that the 
inorganic as such can come to life – nor do I think that life is a rare 
improbability. On the contrary, it seems to me that if we follow current 
geological and cosmological research, such as that of Lee Smolin, and 
philosophies, such as Deleuze’s or that of Gilbert Simondon that attempt 
to address them, there is a gap between matter and life, but it is a gap of 
degrees rather than, as Bergson argued, a difference in kind. There are 
gradations between, say, the ontogenesis of a crystal, the processes of 
metastability that differentiate and co-ordinate the relation between two 
material forms, the germ-seed and the supersaturated liquid from which 
it forms itself, and the genesis of a living individual: indeed living beings 
require and continue the geological movements of minerals, salts and 
other geological forces by which their movements are internally regulated, 
even as the geologic emerges at a different and higher level of 
organization and information in the living (or dead) body. The geologic 
always abides, in Simondon’s terms, as the preindividual and transindividual 
which each individual carries with it both internally, as part of its 
self-constitution, and externally, as (partial-)milieu. So in one sense we, 
as living beings, have a partial but direct access to our own minerality, if I 
can call it that, to the extent that the mineral is a condition of life; on the 
other hand, the geologic order is not simply socially constructed, not 
simply a projection, but a series of abiding and changing forces that we 
do not control, let alone adequately understand, that pose questions to us 
about our own lives, and the ‘life’ or the mode of existence of the mineral. 
I think that we need to see the physico-chemical stratum as both endless 
resource for all future individuations, inorganic or organic, and as the 
lowest order of material organization that persists and remains as a 
resource for ever-elaborating orders of complexity. I don’t think that 
the geologic order is socially constructed, though of course our knowledge 
of it is socially mediated. 
 
 
NC and KY: What obliges us towards the inhuman or, to put it another 
way, what obligations are already posed as deriving from the inhuman? 




EG: I don’t know if I would use the term ‘obligation’ or ‘obliges’ here. 
We are immersed in inhuman forces both outside us and within us, 
whether we know it or not. To be obligated, to feel as if we must be 
drawn to new perspectives or new forms of biopolitics, is an ethical affect. 
If we are inhuman, how are we to understand ourselves, the nature 
around and within us, and politics that positions us? I don’t know. But 
one thing that may be relevant is that the inhuman, as resistance, is 
always to some extent and in some way beyond biopolitics. It is important 
to seek out these sites of resistance at whatever level and manner they 
occur. These sites are those that must be left aside in the rational and 
economic management of ‘things’. But there is something left over that 
remains resistant, that wants what it wants, before and beyond biopower. 
 
NC and KY: We have found your discussion of art as an extraction and 
harnessing of the dynamic forces of the earth very useful for helping to 
understand some of the pyrotechnical arts that emerged in – and helped 
create – the cities of antiquity. It is interesting to consider that crucial 
developments in the use of heat to transform ‘earthy materials’ seem to 
have occurred at a time of late Pleistocene-early Holocene rapid sea level 
rise – an event which earth scientists have also linked to an escalation in 
seismic and volcanic activity. This in turn sparks some questions and 
speculations about what kinds of ‘artistic’ interventions into the chaos 
now being triggered by human-induced climate change we might yet 
witness. There is a growing body of art ‘about’ climate change, but perhaps 
we have yet to see new genres or practices that tap into and work 
with the shifting forces of the contemporary earth. Without any expectation 
of foretelling art-to-come (!), we are interested in your thoughts 
about what we might look for, hope for, dream about, with regards to 




EG: Wow, this is a big question, on a time-scale that is difficult for me to 
contemplate! If Simondon’s work is relevant in this context, it is because 
he understands that crises, problems about how to exist, to bring oneself 
into being and to acquire powers of acting, whether at the inorganic or 
organic levels, always involve creation or invention, which never comes 
easily, and often emerges under the strangest and least conducive conditions 
(such as the art that was produced in concentration camps and 
refugee camps), sometimes without the slightest consciousness. 
Sometimes just a small shift in position enables something to be released 
from chaotic forces and be harnessed for production, whether artistic or 
technical. For Simondon, there are two possible ways of addressing crises 
of the earth – technologies and art (and at their best, technology as art), 
each of which innovate, in their own ways and with their own temporalities. 
If we focus on art, we can see that art has, over the last 200 years, 
become less a representation of something that pre-exists art than the 
exploration of a process or perhaps, even, events that have more and 
more to do with the material conditions and limits of art. I think that, as 
one of the current political crises of the present, climate change, or its 
particular events – storms, rising tides, volcanic and seismic activity – it is 
inevitable that art has and will come to address this in its own terms. We 
must remember that art aims, at the least, at a provisional consistency in 
its harnessing and framing of natural and biological impulses and affects, 
and for this it needs a way of addressing those parts of the earth it 
requires. It needs to invent a way, or many, of addressing what of a 
storm, or any short-term event, it can make of itself. 
 
 
NC and KY: Recent social thought is pervaded by relatively ‘horizontal’ 
models of actual and potential relating, as in networks, interconnectivities, 
rhizomes, and topologies (that most often set out from 2-D space). 
Such reluctance to consider more stratified subtending relations now 
seems somewhat out of proportion to threats of foundational or deterministic 
thinking. By contrast, in your work – especially in the context of 
the inhuman, the geologic, the inorganic – there appears to us an unabashed 
embrace of subtending potentialities and relations. Variously 
drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of stratification, Derrida’s 
inheritance, or Nietzsche’s ‘‘‘that which was’’ is the name of the stone 
he cannot move’ (Grosz, 2004: 150), there is a strong sense in your work 
of domains that are at once out of reach of the political, but also the very 
condition of human politics. Why do you think there is so much reluctance 
in contemporary critical thought to make ontological claims that 
are not immediately and directly accessible to politicization? 
 
EG: It is understandable that there is a reluctance to make ontological 
claims in contemporary philosophy. Ontology, primarily understood in 
terms of metaphysics, has been used precisely as a way of avoiding the 
empirical: by the time Bergson was awarded his Nobel Prize in literature, 
his work was subjected to quite vicious criticism from Bertrand Russell 
and other philosophers in the analytic tradition who understood philosophy 
on the model of logic, as a precise analysis of statements convertible 
into symbols. For at least 50 years, the identification of the metaphysical 
with the physical overcame the power of ontology. To put it too vaguely, 
science, and especially mathematics, provided models that replaced the 
idea of the real with that of logical order. Epistemology overshadowed 
ontology, even though every epistemological position involves ontological 
assumptions. Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson, Deleuze’s intellectual 
touchstones, each elaborate, in very different ways, an order (or 
many) in the universe that was at best only partially addressed through 
the sciences, and only accessible to knowledge through technological 
mediation. What each of them affirmed was an ontology that assumed 
that there is only one world, a world accessible to science but also 
addressed by and always framing living beings in their social, political, 
ethical and aesthetic relations. 
 
Spinoza begins the Ethics from the top-down, from the most abstract 
and necessary assumptions, working to an understanding of the real relations 
between humans, between ideas, and the order of the universe; 
Nietzsche understands that everything, whether living or inert, whether 
microscopic or cosmological, is driven from inside by a will to power that 
not only explains the orders addressed by physics and chemistry but also 
history and politics; and Bergson understands that, if we know the world’s 
orderly causal relations through intelligence, an organ furnished by evolution 
to maximize actions, it must be supplemented by intuition, the 
evolutionary heir of instinct, an understanding of the place of the singular 
within the whole of existence, the shared life of subject and object. Each 
one, in other words – and this is in part what attracted Deleuze to these 
philosophers – develops a way of connecting a larger, natural order to the 
smaller order of human social and collective life non-reductively. Each 
links an understanding of the orders of existence with an understanding of 
the political and social orders that are subjected to historical upheavals. 
Each sees a fundamental link between the distance, the framework or 
perspective provided by ontological analysis, and the near-focus of 
social and political relations, not by analogy (or if it is analogy, as in the 
case of Simondon, it is a reticulated and amplifying analogy) but directly. 
There is no reason that we cannot analyse social, political and cultural life 
through the same lens as we view the orders of the real – as long as we 
understand there must be, as you describe it, different levels or orders of 
the growing complexity and autonomy of the processes of existence. If 
becomings, natural and social, are (self-)regulated, this kind of regulation 
cannot be different in kind to that of the universe itself. 
 
I understand, however, that those committed to a more direct form of 
political action or activism, whether in feminist, queer, postcolonial or 
global terms, see the connection between philosophical theory and political 
practice as more and more tenuous and abstract. This is true. 
Moreover, it is true that political activism has itself always involved 
ontological assumptions, which are sometimes, perhaps, philosophically 
irrelevant but function as modes of mobilization. It seems to me, as a 
feminist theorist, that feminist theory does not, as a whole, need to 
address questions of ontology: this depends on one’s particular project. 
But unless the bigger questions about how to think about the earth, the 
cosmos, and time and history, are also asked, we will remain stuck in 
activisms that are merely reactive – against patriarchy, against sexual 
normalization, against the colonial or the global – rather than fully creative 
and capable of inventing new ways of collective life. 
 
 
NC and KY: You have suggested that art carves out a relatively safe 
corner of the earth’s chaos in which to perform experiments. One of 
the key differences between the spheres of politics and art – at least in 
a conventional modern framing – is that politics involves justifying our 
actions or inaction to others (i.e. giving reasons for our decisions), 
whereas it is presumed that artistic interventions can to some degree 
speak or act for themselves. So we are wondering what your approach 
does to complicate or trouble these differences. If a politics worthy of the 
name calls for trials and experiments whose outcomes cannot be anticipated, 
is the emphasis on the providing of reasons or giving an account 
of oneself over-rated? Or alternatively, if art has the capacity to recompose 
social formations in potentially momentous ways, are we perhaps 
not being demanding enough of its ethical and political responsibilities? 
 
 
EG: I think that art and politics do function quite differently, although 
there is no reason that each mode of practice cannot borrow from or help 
to develop the other. But the most fundamental difference is that art is 
very rarely, with the exception of film and performance arts, a collective 
process (though of course it is capable of collective creation – it more 
commonly is marketed rather than produced collectively). Art is possible 
in a relation between a single individual and a small part of the earth. 
Politics, by contrast, is always collective, always social, completely ineffective 
if it relies on individuals alone. What both art and politics can 
share, though this is increasingly difficult in a political order in which the 
domination of politics occurs through the financial intervention of restabilizing 
orders (such as the interests of particular industries and the operation 
of lobby groups), is that at their best, they are fundamentally 
experimental, open-ended, without a clear-cut goal, but modes of exploration 
of different possible (or virtual) orders. 
 
We have, in the last couple of years, witnessed a series of extraordinary 
political events that were relatively unplanned, that aimed to invent new 
forms of coexistence and that undertook experimental modes of 
organization – from the recent revolutions and the ‘Occupy’ movement 
to Pussy Riot. The latter two political events remain closer to art than to 
conventionally conceived politics. Politics, like art, requires the capacity 
to freshly address and mobilize something – a movement of coordinated 
people, a movement of qualities – so each requires an energetic revitalization 
to remain relevant. I myself have found that the old leftist forms 
of politics – Marxist-oriented class politics, the identity bases of feminism, 
LGBTQ and post-colonialism, for example – do not seem able to 
mobilize a new constituency as they once did. This does not mean the end 
of such political struggles, but it may mean rethinking, or experimenting 
with, new goals, new struggles, new questions, thinking more ‘artistically’. 
And art practices, often regarded merely as forms of self expression, 
are themselves, at least in part, political explorations of the materials and 
contexts of art, forms of self-questioning of the field itself. I am reluctant to 
speak of the ethical or political responsibilities of art that are somehow 
outside art: art doesn’t need to be responsible for ethics or politics to be 
able to engage with ethics or politics. But ethics and politics are different, if 
not unrelated, practices that art may address but which have their own 
methods, tactics and goals. These practices – aesthetic practices (creation 
and reception), political practices (collective or group interests insofar as 
they struggle with each other), and ethical practices (the creation of ways to 
live, the invention of values by which to live) –can align, though always in 
ad hoc or unpredictable ways. 
 
 
NC and KY: You have spoken of politics as ‘an invention, a labour of 
fabrication, of experimentation’, more linked to artistic production than 
to more conventional political concerns of planning, policy-making and 
such (Grosz, 2005: 260). Contemporary critical thought around the political 
still seems much more wedded to notions of recognition, fair and 
open communication, and continuous dialogue than it does to hands-on 
experimentation with the physical stuff of the world. Even when the 
more-than-human ‘composition’ of worlds is at stake, it appears that 
we are being called on to prioritize processes of discussion and the seeking 
of consensus. Occasionally in times of crisis, such as during 
Hurricane Katrina, authorities have been criticized, among other 
things, for sticking to the regulations and not improvising boldly 
enough. More often, however, the ‘state of exception’ is invoked, and 
critical thinkers offer dire warnings about any intervention that bypasses 
due political process. Perhaps this is most pronounced today in the deep 
suspicion that surrounds any consideration of ‘geoengineering’ responses 
to the climate predicament. Is there a tension here? Do you see a more 
open-ended and experimental politics as necessarily subsumed in collective 
decision-making processes, or might there be occasions where it is 
conceivable to lead with more practical interventions? To put it another 
way, might we not see in the ascendance of certain modes of geo-technics 
the beginnings of an exploration of a space of possibilities that critical 
political practices have evacuated or failed to claim? 
 
 
EG: You are right to suggest that many, if not most, forms of contemporary 
critical thought are committed to the notion that it is classes or 
groups of individuals, those who share elements of an ‘identity’, that 
constitute the various competing political interests that struggle within 
the social order. They also tend to share the belief that recognition of 
minoritarian identities as ‘equal’ to all others by the social majority is a 
condition of a successful struggle. Politics is, in such a view, the struggle 
for ‘others’ of all kinds, including in some cases animals, to acquire the 
recognition of society as proper persons and equal members of civil society. 
But there has always been a strand of experimentation and the enjoyment 
of upheaval even within the most rigorous and sincere forms of 
recognized political struggle, an anti-consensual, autonomy-seeking 
mode of affirmation (perhaps it is Nietzsche who pioneered such a politics, 
a politics of the wayward individual outside of organized groups 
and never seeking recognition!), from Emma Goldman and the anarchists 
to radical feminism and to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Part of 
the problem is that there are two tendencies within political struggle that 
should not be mediated – a desire for a place in collective life, and a 
desire for an autonomous, that is, self-regulated life – that is, between 
equality and autonomy. Revolutionary upheavals rarely occur collectively 
(though there are exceptions, such as the ‘Arab Spring’ and 
‘Occupy’, whose long-term effects are not yet clear): but it is up to collective 
practices to bring revolutions into existence. So I really want to 
resist the regulation of experimentation and invention by collective agreement; 
but equally I want to resist the regulation of collective practices – 
such as the work of the sciences, of artists, of ‘theorists’, of workers – by 
experimentation. 
 
If we want to use the example of geoengineering, an excellent example 
in this context, the practice, and the technical ensembles that are required 
to undertake large geoengineering projects, it is both true that it is likely 
that interventions into nature on such a large scale (both financial, geographical 
and technical) are going to be regulated by the demands of 
profit and consumerism (this is strikingly clear with the mining of vast 
regions of Western Australia, say, which do not profit the earth or its 
local inhabitants and indeed tend to harm them). On the other hand, 
geoengineering projects have immense potential to reform parts of the 
earth for different modes of inhabitation – the creation of dams, or 
architecture, to take the simplest examples – which, while harming 
some animal life, enhances other forms. Like all forms of technical invention, 
geoengineering has the potentiality for immense change. But without 
the careful regulating of competing interests – those of the local and 
more general environment, those of the inhabitants of a region, those 
flows of energy and minerals that run through a location as well as those 
of employment and economic production – it is right that we feel fear and 
anxiety at the likelihood of further destruction of our environment. And 
it is right for us to be very suspicious when corporations and governments 
inform us that such vast projects will ‘help’ a population rather 
than a small fragment of a population. 
 
 
NC and KY: While many of the questions being posed in critical theory 
take the organization of life and nonlife as a point of departure for 
a politics of differentiation, could you suggest what other passages of 
thought and material configuration might the inhuman provoke? 
How might recognition of the resistance of being or, to put it another 




EG: The inhuman is a very general concept that seems to really only be 
able to be pinpointed by explaining what it is not. If the inhuman is the 
non-human, then it encompasses the non-living, material or natural 
order, what is before or beyond the human. Then it is not only the 
material that faces the inhuman, it is also ideality or conceptuality that 
is inhuman. This ideality, rationality or order is often understood in 
religious or artistic terms, but it is as much a condition of matter as it 
is for life. The difference between and connection of materiality to ideality 
makes clear that the human is always in excess of itself, always 
moving beyond the human, even in its most characteristic acts. If thinking, 
inventing, acting, are characteristics of even material forces, then the 
human is composed of intensities that are themselves not human, or not 
only human. 
 
I am not sure that I understand what you mean by ‘a resistance of 
being towards the living’. I think, from an earlier question where you 
suggested the rarity of life, that I don’t agree with this. Life seems to 
me to be possible in many forms which may not be actualized or whose 
differences we haven’t adequately understood. Indeed, as Stephen Jay 
Gould made clear in his work on the Burgess Shale Formation, many 
forms of Cambrian life that are utterly unrecognizable as of this earth 
clearly existed but were subject to massive waves of extinction. Other 
forms of life replace them, taking advantage of ecological devastation. 
There is a tendency to life whenever the orders of ideality and materiality 
emerge, which is to say from the simplest ‘particle’ or element of 
matter to the most complex forms of social organization. The self-organizing 
properties of matter are forms of affinity and boundary, a 
spark of indeterminacy as Bergson understands it, that condition life 
and beckon its experimental emergence. This is why it is not only subjects 
but also objects that require individuation, processes which produce 
them and enable their relations to form each other. All of matter 
tends to life in different degrees of openness, and with different forms of 
ideality. 
 
NC and KY: If we recognize life’s promiscuity in the realm of ecological 
devastation, could we also not say that life, to a certain degree, is towards 
certain modes of extinction as much as it is towards the flourishing of 
life? That is, might we recognize a realm of division in life’s affiliation 
that might helpfully (or not!) articulate the ‘two lives’ – human and 
inhuman – of life? 
 
 
EG: Yes, life is, on a cellular level, directed towards extinction (with rare 
exceptions, such as the self-regenerating hydra); but at the level of the 
organism, life is directed to the future of life, even in the face of extinction. 
This may in some small measure explain the irrational resistance to 
the catastrophic forces of climate change. There are not just ‘two lives’ 
we live, human and inhuman, but many, many lives (perhaps even all the 
gradations between the human and the inhuman by which the human 
came into existence), each with their own power and force. And there are 
many deaths. I don’t think that life is oriented to extinction: but its 
fragility and dependence on quite narrow conditions makes it always 
provisional. The human’s future orientation has made the human blind 
to the supporting conditions, the associated milieus, that it relies on and 
must support and regenerate. 
 
 
NC and KY: Trying to be cognizant of the inhuman raises questions about 
how to write for/with ‘others’ when those others are inhuman. What or 
where is the realm of the inhuman in the context of writing or being 
written, in modes of inscription, compulsion or obligation? 
 
 
EG: This is the question, one that is not entirely new. Roger Caillois 
wanted to talk about stones as if they were subjects, as if they were 
sentient. Simondon too claims that our being human and social is conditioned 
on our relations to a natural order and to the technical objects 
we have produced from our immersion in this order. We have ceaselessly 
attempted to write for and of objects: it is only recently that we have 
come to understand more clearly what writings with them, or between 
them, might involve. It must involve an awareness of our own inhuman 
connections, both genetic and affective, our own capacity to spill over 
our human boundaries; but it must also involve a submission to 
enformed materiality and its particular qualities. We have a model for 
such an engagement already. It comes from the world of art, and even the 
artisanal, which does nothing but inscribe the material through the 
human. Writing needs to come closer to the labour of artistic production 
if it is to touch objects, and others, the inhuman, in a different way than 
as speculative passive object of reflection. 
 
 
NC and KY: Are there any particular ways in which you are interested in 
how the inhuman gives testimony? 
 
 
EG: ‘Testimony’ is too religious a term to suit me. The inhuman gives rise 
to information, an overflow of information, which is both the movement 
of certain forces and the possibility of their being known. So I am interested 
in how we can ‘read’ the inhuman, however provisionally, whether 
it is in terms of science, technology, philosophy or art. It does not speak. 
We have to learn how things, processes, events – inhuman forces in their 
broadest sense – address us without language ever being adequate for the 
task. We have to invent ways to return to it the knowledge that it imparts 
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